Academia’s Whistleblower Obsession
This post was written by Josh
Whistleblowers are getting a lot of attention from academics these days. Just last week, in fact, we wrote about a study conducted by a group of finance professors which found that whistleblowers--employees in particular--are the most effective at finding corporate fraud. Now, another study has come out, this one with much more troubling implications.
The study, conducted by accounting professors Jacob Rose and James Hunton, has found that landmark regulations designed to prevent financial fraud by relying on anonymous whistleblowers are dysfunctional and ineffective. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (affectinonaetly referred to as SOX) has had unfortunate unintended consequences. Specifically, the audit committees of publicly traded companies required by SOX fail to investigate tips from anonymous whistleblowers relative to named ones--particularly when the whistleblower's information poses a threat to corporate directors.
Professors Rose and Hunton conducted an experiment in which 83 highly experienced audit committees examined whistleblowers' allegations of corporate reporting malfeasance, and were then asked to allocate resources for investigations. According to Professor Rose,
We concluded that audit committee members who evaluate whistle-blowing allegations and determine whether or not allegations should be investigated treat anonymous and non-anonymous allegations very differently. Audit committee members find anonymous allegations to be less credible than non-anonymous allegations. As a result, audit committee members often choose not to investigate an anonymous allegation, even when the allegation indicates very serious threats to the integrity of the financial reporting system. When an identical allegation is not anonymous, audit committees allocate significant resources to the investigation of the allegation. In brief, anonymous allegations appear to be ignored in many cases.
The anonymous whistleblowers study seems to offer strong support for the conclusion reached by the authors of the "Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?" study. One of the conclusions of that study was that there need to be more avenues of financial compensation available to whistleblowers, considering the high personal, professional, and pecuniary stakes whistleblowers face. If the corporate audit committees required by SOX are ignoring anonymous whistleblowers, then whistleblowers need to have more external outlets through which they can both disclose fraud and receive a monetary incentive.
Health Care Bill Passed; Whistleblowers Needed!
This post was written by Josh
Now that Congress has finally passed the health care bill, there will be an even greater need for whistleblowers to identify fraud in the health care industry, particularly in relation to Medicare and Medicaid. The health care bill gives little "gifts" to insurance companies and hospitals, including insurance giant Kaiser Permanante and doctor-owned facilities in about a dozen states including Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee.
In terms of Medicaid, the health care bill is notable in that it expands coverage to include 133% of the poverty level ($29,327 for a family of four) and will require states to expand Medicaid to include childless adults starting in 2014. As for Medicare, drug companies have been thrown a serious bone. Seniors covered under Medicare Advantage will receive a 50% discount on name brand drugs in 2011, whereas presently they must pay thousands in out of pocket costs once they hit the "doughnut hole"-- the coverage gap in prescription drug benefits. The doughnut hole led to many seniors going off their prescription medications or splitting pills to cut costs, which in turn affected drug makers' bottom lines.
In general, the brand-name drug industry was a winner as a result of the health care bill. The pharmaceutical industry will keep its $80 billion a year agreement to provide savings and rebates. Fees charged to drug makers will be offset by the fact that drug makers stand to enjoy more customers, as more patients will be insured and receiving prescription drugs (as many as 32 million Americans will now have some type of insurance). The bill maintains the 50% discount for Medicare recipients, and the government will pay for another 25% discount. The bill also gives biological drug makers a 12 year period of exclusivity before the information necessary to create generic versions is made available to others. Critics argue that this provision will keep life-saving therapies out of reach of many patients. Biologics are drugs that are grown inside living cells using gene splicing techniques, and biotech companies guard their production secrets very closely. Companies like Genentech have scored big hits with certain cancer drugs, but these drugs remain very expensive.
Hospitals have also been given some gifts in the health care bill. For example, hospitals in Tennessee were given a combined $100 million in Medicaid "Disproportionate Share Hospital" payments for 2012 and 2013. Officials insist that the payments were not a "special deal" in order to get Tennessee Democrats to vote for the bill (one Tennessee Congressman, Democrat Bart Gordon, did announce that he would change his November vote and support the health care bill).
Reading between the lines in all of this, it seems that there will be many new opportunities for fraud. With millions of new patients now having access to prescription drugs and receiving treatment at hospitals flush with Medicaid payments, the potential for fraud is greatly expanded. All you health care whistleblowers out there, keep your eyes open.
Study Finds Whistleblowers are the Fraud-Finding Pros
This post was written by Josh
Back in the fear-infused days of fall 2001, when it seemed that a plane full of terrorists and Anthrax-wielding snipers was lurking around every corner, a whistleblower was helping to uncover the Enron scandal--just before the company imploded. Sherron Watkins was Vice President of Corporate Development at Enron, and she identified serious problems at the company and brought these issues to the attention of CEO Kenneth Lay (who of course proceeded to do his own thing). Watkins later testified before Congress and the Senate in the aftermath of Enron's meltdown.
Enron and other corporate frauds piqued the interest of academia, and now a new study in The Journal of Finance has found the best fraud "sniffer dogs" in the corporate world are not regulators but whistleblowers--specifically employees. The study is entitled "Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?". The authors, finance professors Alexander Dyck, Adair Morse, and Luigi Zingales, were intrigued by the fact that the legislature acted quickly to fight corporate fraud by enacting the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), but no substantive research was ever conducted on who was actually identifying fraud.
The researchers analyzed 216 cases of alleged corporate fraud between 1996 and 2004, including Enron and its loathsome brethren in fraud, WorldCom and HealthSouth. Their most important conclusion was that employees were the whistleblowers in 17 percent of the cases--more than any other actors. Employees were far more effective in identifying fraud than the SEC--the government agency responsible for regulating the securities industry. In fact, the SEC detected only 6.6 of the fraud cases, ranking behind analysts (13.8%) and short sellers (14.5%).
The second major conclusion of the study is that there is little incentive for most whistleblowers to uncover fraud. One researcher notes that
Auditors, analysts, and employees do not seem to gain much and, in the cases of employees, seem to lose outright from whistleblowing.
The only actors who seem to benefit outright from being whistleblowers are journalists involved in major cases and (drumroll) employees who have access to a qui tam suit. The researchers conclude that there should be more financial compensation structures for whistleblowers who come forward, which they describe as "sharpening the incentives of those who are endowed with information."
This study provides important empirical evidence regarding the essential role qui tam whistleblowers play in today's regulatory environment. Hopefully legislators will pay attention and expand the system of monetary incentives to reward more corporate fraud finders. Employees who blow the whistle on corporate fraud have the most to lose from their actions, so they deserve to be compensated for doing the right thing.



